Will Japan's Current Account Turn to Deficit? by F. Gerard Adams & Byron Gangnes
WILL JAPAN’S CURRENT
ACCOUNT TURN TO DEFICIT?
by
F. Gerard Adams and Byron Gangnes
Working Paper No. 00-10
May 2000 
Will Japan's Current Account Turn to Deficit? 
 
F. Gerard Adams, Northeastern University 












The Japanese current account has been in surplus since 1981, ranging from 1% to more than 
4% of GDP.  In this paper, we review the macroeconomic forces that have driven the surplus 
and describe likely changes in the first part of the next century.  In coming years, structural 
change in Japan’s economy—population aging, the globalization of production, and financial 
market reforms—will alter the underlying determinants of the surplus.  While the net effect 
of these forces is difficult to predict, the most likely outcome is a gradual closing of the 
current account gap.  We use large-model simulation analysis to evaluate the potential for 
specific developments to alter the current account, and we assess their likely impact on the 
Japanese economy.   
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1.  Introduction 
  Japan’s current account has been in surplus for many years.  From a Japanese 
perspective, the surplus has provided market outlets for Japanese manufactures and high tech 
products and has been the basis for capital flows into foreign investment. From the 
perspective of other industrial countries, the surplus has represented a source of cheap 
foreign savings, but has also created political pressure through job losses in import-
competing sectors.  The Japanese surplus has been attributed to the structure of the Japanese 
economy: its high savings rate, its promotion of exports of manufactures, and, until recently, 
its reluctance to accept imports.   
While the relative size of Japan’s surplus has fluctuated since the early 1980s, it has 
remained in surplus territory, with the broadest measure of trade balance, the current 
account, ranging from 1% to more than 4% of GDP.  (Figure 1.)  The surplus receded in the 
late 1980s, following the dollar collapse mid-decade and an investment boom in Japan.  But it 
picked up again with the end of the bubble economy, and the subsequent economic recovery 
in the U.S.  (See the discussion in Adams and Gangnes, 1996.)  Following the yen’s 
appreciation of 1993 to 1995 and some moderate recovery of the Japanese economy in the 
mid 1990s, the surplus once more fell back toward near balance measured in yen; though the 
politically-sensitive dollar merchandise trade surplus remained in the $80 billion range.  The 
surplus has risen again recently, as robust U.S. growth has continued and Japan’s economy 
has faltered.  While the Asian crisis has hit Japanese exports to the East Asian region, the 
surplus is likely to widen further as a result of the deep Japanese downturn that began in 
1998. 
The threat of an ever-widening Japanese surplus might be a matter of economic and 
political concern but for several developments likely to bring about an eventual narrowing of 
the trade gap.  In the medium term, economic recovery in Japan will eliminate a large cyclical 
component of the surplus.  Over the longer term, structural change in Japan’s economy—  2
population aging, the globalization of production, and financial market reforms—will alter 
the underlying determinants of the surplus.   
  The future path of Japan’s current account balance has implications for Japan’s 
economy domestically, for international political economy and for global capital markets.  For 
the domestic economy, a reduction in the current account surplus would negatively impact 
aggregate demand.  There is also likely to be a redistribution of economic activity across 
sectors.  Changes in trade balances and the industrial mix would require potentially painful 
adjustments in industrial and labor markets.  These effects of trade adjustment could generate 
political resistance in Japan not unlike what we observed in the U.S. in the 1980s.   
  From an international perspective, however, reduction of the Japanese trade surplus 
would ease political pressures.  Arguments that the large surplus has enabled Japan to export 
its potential unemployment have served as a basis for imposing restrictions on Japanese 
exports in many markets.  A decline in Japan’s surplus trade balance would be welcomed by 
Japan’s trading partners.  On the other hand, Japan has recycled its trade surpluses as capital 
outflows to both the developed and developing world.  A reduction in Japanese capital 
outflows would change the global savings-investment balance, probably raising world interest 
rates. 
This paper looks at the prospects for Japanese current account balance adjustment in 
coming years.  In section 2, we describe the macroeconomic forces driving the trade surplus.  
We distinguish between the long-run structural surplus and short-run cyclical movements.  In 
section 3, we describe fundamental changes in Japan likely to influence the path of the trade 
balance in the first decades of the next century.  Section 4 uses simulation analysis to study 
aspects of these changes and to assess their potential impact on the Japanese economy.  We 
make concluding comments in section 5.   3
2.  The macroeconomics of Japan’s current account 
We can learn something about the origin of the Japanese surplus and its future 
prospects by examining the surplus in the light of a simple conceptual model of the balance 
of payments.  This model, incorporating both real and financial influences on the payments 
position, is useful for understanding medium term current account adjustment and the 
determination of the long run equilibrium path.1 
The forces operating on the current account can be viewed from two perspectives, the 
trade perspective and the capital flow perspective.  Abstracting from unilateral transfers, the 
current account equals the goods and services trade balance (NX) which reflects demand in 
the domestic economy (Y), foreign demand (Yf), relative prices and the exchange rate 
(P/Pf*XR) acting on exports and imports: 
NX = f(Y, Yf, P/Pf*XR).                                        (1) 
The long-term evolution of trade flows is driven by growth in incomes and changes in 
relative competitiveness, as well as any change in the propensity to import at home and 
abroad.  Business-cycle fluctuations in income and misalignments of the real exchange rate 
can exert strong influences on net exports in the medium run.  In the Japanese case, import 
propensities have not been high, nor have trade flows been particularly sensitive to relative 
price or exchange rate movements.  In part this reflects the strength of Japanese brands in 
export markets and, until recently, the difficulties of foreign producers in selling imported 
products in the Japanese market.  Japanese firms have also tended to resist “passing through” 
to customers the effect of exchange rate appreciation, further limiting current account 
adjustment.  (Marston, 1990; Knetter, 1993.) 
From the capital flow perspective, the surplus on NX represents the supply of foreign 
exchange, which must equal net demand for foreign exchange, comprising private capital 
outflows (CF) and changes in official reserves (dR): 
NX = CF  + dR.                                                      (2)   4
Capital outflows (CF) represent net additions to holdings of foreign assets.  The 
demand for these assets depends on the available flow of saving (the overall rate of asset 
accumulation) in the domestic economy (S) and relative rates of return at home and abroad 
adjusted for the exchange rate and expectations about future exchange rate change (i, if, XR, 
dXRe):2 
CF = f( S, i, if, XR, dXRe)                                         (3) 
Other factors that affect the desired asset mix will also affect capital flows.  Strong demand 
for foreign assets can produce a capital outflow from the home country and therefore 
contribute to a current account surplus.  This appears to have been an important part of the 
story behind the yen’s relative weakness between 1995 and 1998.  Japanese investors displayed 
a continuing desire to accumulate foreign assets, driving down the value of the home 
currency and helping to generate a rising net export surplus. 
The current account then depends on the interplay of international trade and 
competitiveness with underlying determinants of saving and asset allocation.  The balance of 
payments relationships (1) through (3) are part of the broader macroeconomic system that 
includes domestic and foreign goods markets, financial relationships, and factor markets.  In 
the absence of exchange rate intervention, equilibrium for the complete economic system 
entails the simultaneous determination of the remaining endogenous variables, including 
income, interest rates, exchange rates and prices. 
There are important differences in the macroeconomic adjustment process between 
the short run and the long run.  In the short run, changes in the trade conditions, or in 
demand for foreign assets will impact the exchange rate and net exports.  For example, an 
exogenously caused change in net exports will alter GDP and induce additional changes in 
savings and import demand. The current account both affects and is affected by business 
cycle conditions.  In the long run, saving depends on intertemporal preferences for 
consumption relative to expected lifetime resources, as in the life cycle model (Modigliani, 
1966).  Changes in international relative prices and interest rates will cause the excess of   5
domestic saving over domestic investment at full employment to flow into international 
capital markets.3  In this way, long-term trends in net savings imply a corresponding pattern 
for the current account balance (Razin, l995, and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996.)  
Intertemporal choice by Japanese residents may explain much of the persistent 
surpluses.4  As is noted in Mason and Ogawa (this volume), Japanese demographic 
characteristics and institutions have favored high private savings in the Post-War period.  
Since the 1950s, the age composition of Japanese society has shifted dramatically toward the 
prime income earning age groups and savings rates have risen.  Current high savings rates, 
only a little below their l980s peaks, may then reflect in part high levels of life cycle savings by 
the post war generation now in its peak earning years.  Econometric models based on life-
cycle consumption theory frequently find a significant negative savings effect from both 
youth and old age dependency ratios.5  Further aging of the economy of course has 
implications for the future course of Japanese savings, an issue we will take up in section 3.  
(For a wide-ranging discussion of factors behind Japan’s high savings rate, also see Horioka, 
1990.) 
The very fact that the Japanese economy was growing rapidly in the post-war period 
may explain high rates of savings. For most countries, the literature finds a tight link between 
rates of economic growth and rates of savings.  (See, for example, Bosworth, 1993, p. 72, and 
Adams and Prazmowski, 1996.)  In part, this may reflect the fact that rapidly-growing 
populations have demographics that favor increased savings.  But it may also reflect workers’ 
desire to accumulate retirement wealth sufficient to support the higher living standards 
expected in the future, or simply an adjustment lag as households adapt to increased 
consumption opportunities.  In any event, the implication is that slower growth in the future 
would mean lower saving. 
Government saving or dissaving also has implications for Japan’s balance of 
payments.6  A number of writers have observed a link between government budget balances 
in the U.S. and Japan and the emergence of large current account imbalances in the 1980s.    6
(See, for example, Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997, p. 313, and Bergsten and Noland, 1993.) 
However, recent experience suggests a weaker link between government and national savings.  
There has already been a massive reversal of public sector saving in Japan, from surpluses in 
the l980s and early l990s to deficits running some 10 percent of GDP at present.  And further 
deficit financing is intended to boost the lagging Japanese economy.  Still the current account 
surplus remains wide.  Expectations of future tax liabilities may be encouraging higher 
private sector savings.  No matter what one thinks of the doctrinaire Ricardian equivalence 
proposition, the Japanese government’s on again, off again imposition of temporary tax cuts 
would make even the most spend-thrift Japanese consumer cautious about spending all of the 
tax reductions. 
Aside from these long-run considerations, cyclical factors have bolstered the Japanese 
surplus.  Economic stagnation during the 1990s has limited the demand for all goods, 
including imports, raising the current account surplus above the level that would prevail at 
full employment.  The yen’s recent weakness may push the surplus up further, although this 
will be mitigated by weaker demand by Asian developing economies for Japanese exports.   
An indication of the role of cyclical factors in the Japanese current account surplus 
can be obtained using a counterfactual simulation of recent Japanese macroeconomic 
experience.  We have simulated a path for the Japanese economy during the period 1992-
1998, using the Japanese Long-term Model, described in greater detail in section 4, below.  
The simulation imposes a flat path for the yen/dollar exchange rate at 128, its value in 1991, 
eliminating the appreciation/depreciation cycle over the period.  Parallel adjustments were 
made against other currencies.  Japanese private consumption was adjusted to maintain 
approximately a 3% annual growth rate of real Gross National Expenditure (GNE), a much 
more rapid rate of growth than the 0.9% actually experienced.  The cyclically adjusted current 
account path is graphed alongside the actual path in Figure 2.  Weak Japanese growth in the 
early 90s and a steadily appreciating currency contributed $30 billion to $40 billion to the 
current account balance in that period.  This difference jumps in 1995 with the sharp   7
transitory move to 85 yen/dollar.  In 1996 the current account path was above its potential 
path because of the one-time growth surge associated with changes in Japanese consumption 
taxes.  In 1998, about $23 billion dollars (1% of GNE) separates projected actual and 
cyclically adjusted paths.   
Macroeconomic stabilization policies are an important influence on the business cycle 
path.  The Japanese experience of the 1990s provides ample evidence of the importance of 
Keynesian views about the role of fiscal and monetary policy during recession (Krugman, 
1998).  Monetary policy has been driven to its limit, with extremely low interest rates—which 
at the same time make unlikely further monetary policy stimulus and reduce returns to assets 
in Japan, encouraging asset flows abroad. 7  Fiscal policy, on the other hand, provided 
substantial stimulus in the mid-l990s, only to be turned off in l997 by tax increases in a vain 
effort to balance the budget, with the anticipated negative effect on demand.  Below we take a 
look at the role for policy in Japanese recovery by simulating the effects of fiscal stimulus to 
move the economy toward a full-employment growth path.  
The discussion in this section leads us to draw the following conclusions about 
Japan's recent current account experience: 
 
•  The balance of payments surplus has reflected the continued competitiveness 
of Japanese manufactures in the world market and, perhaps, the difficulties 
encountered by competitors to introduce their products into Japan. 
 
•  The persistence of the surplus reflects the large Japanese demand for foreign 
assets, a large volume of saving seeking outlets at higher returns abroad than 
at home.  This strong foreign asset demand stems in part from life-cycle 
motives for high savings, and perhaps also the attractiveness of foreign 
investment opportunities. 
 
•  As a consequence, the equilibrium exchange rate has not adjusted to eliminate 
the current account surplus. 
 
•  The continued positive balance provides demand for products of the Japanese 
economy. On one hand, the surplus is the result of a depressed economy, on 
the other, the Japanese cyclical situation would be considerably worse but for 
the surplus.   8
 
3.  The future of Japan’s current account surplus 
Many of the underpinnings of Japan’s high rate of saving and current account surplus 
are likely to undergo substantial change over the next 10-25 years.  Demographics that have 
favored rapid wealth accumulation will gradually be replaced by an aging population’s need to 
draw down net savings.  The structure of Japanese production and consumption is moving 
toward greater specialization on high tech products and services and to increased reliance on 
imports of low- and medium-tech manufactures, perhaps raising Japan’s overall import 
propensities.  Deregulation of financial markets will eliminate many barriers to the free flow 
of international capital, with potential implications for the capital account.  While there are 
considerable uncertainties, these changes are likely to produce a smaller, rather than larger, 
trade surplus.   
3.1  The aging economy 
The changes about which we know the most are the demographic ones.  As has been 
discussed at length in Mason and Ogawa (this volume), the aging process will accelerate in 
coming years, so that by 2025, 32 percent of Japan’s population will be over the age of 65, and 
the youth dependency ratio will fall to 19%.  (United Nations, 1994.)8 While the process of 
change will be gradual, with only small changes perceptible during the next decade, these 
changes may ultimately have profound impacts. 
A smaller labor force  
A gradual decrease in the labor force is already under way as new entrants fail to 
replace those who leave it through death or retirement.  In the short run, entries into the 
labor force are largely known, given the age distribution of the youth population.  There 
remains uncertainty with respect to the length of time young people remain as students, the 
labor force participation of women, and immigration.  Forecasting exits from the labor force 
is more problematic because increased demand for labor and changes in retirement and   9
pension policies may lengthen working life.  On the other hand, the proportion of the elderly 
who work in Japan is unusually high, and recent trends have been toward earlier retirement.   
The implications of declining labor force translate into a tighter labor market 
constraint assuming there is no corresponding change on the demand side. In the short run, 
assuming a business cycle recovery, slower labor force growth means tighter labor market 
conditions and  wage cost pressures that may limit expansion and reduce Japan’s international 
competitiveness.  In the long run, the economy may adjust with rising wages relative to the 
return to capital.  Slower labor force growth almost certainly means slower aggregate 
economic growth in Japan, although not a reduction in per capita growth. 
Changes in aggregate saving and investment 
A number of studies have projected the effect of aging on Japan’s savings and 
investment.  Because of differences in methodology and underlying assumptions, the studies 
give conflicting results.  (See Mason and Ogawa, this volume, and Yashiro and Oishi, 1997.) 
On the saving side, there are great difficulties in forecasting saving propensities in a world 
where more people are getting into the “high saving ages” before retirement, at the same time 
that more of them are retiring and living longer, a period of dissaving.  There may also be 
changes in intergenerational family relationships or in public pension systems that affect 
retirement savings.  The studies differ in their focus on private or national savings, and, in the 
case of the latter, their assumptions about fiscal policy.  The consensus points to a likely 
reduction in the Japanese saving rate as the population ages.9  This transformation is not 
unique to Japan, but its pace and extent are unusual.  On this basis alone, one would expect 
the current account to narrow in coming years. 
It is the balance of savings and investment that will determine the long run evolution 
of Japan’s current account.  An older population and a declining labor force will favor less 
capital formation, because of lower demands for capital to equip new entrants to the work 
force.   Also, fewer people will reach the age for family formation, reducing the demand for   10
residential investment.  On the other hand, increasing consumption propensities that 
accompany population aging may fuel a rise in investment spending, at least within the 
medium-term horizon of traditional macroeconomic forecasting.  The net response of 
investment depends importantly on assumptions about how labor productivity will change 
with a declining labor force and the degree of international capital mobility, which affects the 
evolution of investment returns.  (Yashiro and Oishi, 1997.) 
The consensus appears to favor a reduction in Japanese investment, but at a slower 
rate of decline than savings.  Assuming a return to prosperity, the external balance will show 
smaller surpluses in coming decades.10   
Change in the composition of expenditures 
Changes in the composition of expenditures as the population ages may affect the 
industrial structure and trade, quite apart from changes in aggregate demand or the overall 
savings-investment balance.  An older population spends its income on a higher proportion 
of personal and professional services (for example medical services, nursing home care, and 
perhaps tourism and leisure activities) and a lower fraction of durable goods, which have 
presumably been accumulated at earlier stages of the life cycle.  This shift toward services 
almost certainly means a shift toward domestically-produced goods and away from tradable 
goods, requiring significant structural adjustment of production to meet the new demands.  
In the case of Japan, an economy where labor is relatively scarce, a shift toward labor 
intensive demand will aggravate labor market pressures.  In addition, an aging society will 
make differing demands on government, requiring larger outlays for medical services and 
pensions, with reduced spending on education.  (See Masson and Tryon, 1990, and Heller, 
1986.)  These changes may ultimately have adverse impacts on aggregate growth as well as 
their sectoral effects.   11
3.2  Japan’s changing relationship with Asia 
The Japanese economy is closely tied to other East Asian economies, both as a 
supplier of capital and goods and services and as a purchaser.  As East Asia has advanced up 
the “development ladder,” this interaction has tended to expand and to change.  (Adams and 
Shachmurove, 1997.)  The ability of the developing Asian economies to produce high quality 
consumer products at low cost has given them a competitive advantage in many product 
lines, beginning some years ago with processed foods and apparel and proceeding more 
recently to consumer electronics, automobiles, and other more sophisticated products.  Japan 
has supplied parts and capital goods to the burgeoning industries of East Asia.   
As an importer of East Asian products, Japan has lagged behind the United States 
and Western Europe, who have drawn increasing shares of their mass production consumer 
products from East Asia.  In fact, Japanese consumption overall has been disproportionately 
served by domestic production, illustrated by the low Japanese import propensities compared 
with other developed economies.  (See Figure 3.)  Some evidence that this has begun to 
change can be seen in the upward trend in import propensities in the past decade and in the 
shift of imports from Asia to manufactured goods and high-tech capital goods.  Japan is 
turning increasingly toward East Asia as a purchaser as well as a supplier.  
Table 2 provides a rough breakdown of trade categories by resource intensity.  Note 
that the labor and land intensive products may be best suited for countries at early stages of 
development.  In turn, the high tech category is clearly most appropriate for countries like 
Japan that lack land, labor, and other resources, but have physical and human capital.  The 
composition of trade flows from and into Japan by principal sector in l980 and in l992 is then 
compared to comparable flows for Europe and the United States in Table 3.  This table 
provides an indication of trends that may be anticipated to continue in the next decade.   
Japanese imports and exports have changed in composition over the l980 to l992 time 
period.  Imports in 1992 have a substantially higher content of mass produced and high tech 
products (the 5 and 6 categories) than in 1980.  A similar change, of smaller dimension, is   12
apparent in Japanese exports, which are predominantly in the high tech category in l992.  
Japan still lags far behind the United States and Europe in its imports of high tech goods, 
though it is catching up in imports of industrial materials and mass production manufactures.  
In 1992, industrial materials and mass production manufactures accounted for 25.6%, 26.4% 
and 35.8 % of imports in Japan, the United States, and Europe, respectively; high tech 
products account for 23.3%, 54.2%, and 43.5% in the three regions.   
It is likely that imports of industrial materials and mass production manufactures will 
continue to increase over the next decade.  This prediction reflects two parallel developments.  
First, Japanese producers are expected to continue to expand production of parts and 
intermediate materials in East Asia for shipment to their assembly operations in Japan.  This 
shift from domestic industries toward foreign suppliers reflects shifting comparative 
advantage conditions in recent years, as Japan’s production costs have risen relative to Asian 
developing economies.  The current crisis in East Asia may accelerate this process by 
increasing the price competitiveness of offshore plants.11    Second, Japanese inward foreign 
investment, which has been nearly negligible so far, is likely to increase.  (See Blomstrom, 
Konan and Lipsey (this volume).)  If patterns observed in other countries hold, foreign firms 
in Japan will rely heavily on intra-firm trade with the parent firm and its overseas subsidiaries.  
This will further raise Japanese imports of materials and manufactured products. 
These changes will affect the total volume of imports as well as their composition.  
The sectoral, regional, and employment impacts are likely to be more severe than the effects 
on aggregate GDP and related measures of economic performance.12  Industries like steel, 
auto parts, apparel, and small electronics are likely to be hurt.  The workers displaced may not 
easily find alternative employment.  Since these industries are concentrated geographically as 
well as sectorally, the burden of adjusting to these changes may be heavy in some localities.     13
3.3  Institutional change in financial markets and financial institutions 
Important changes in Japan’s financial markets and financial institutions are under 
way.  The details of these changes and their implications are discussed in Ito and Melvin (this 
volume). 13  At least in principle, the evolution in financial markets has the potential to affect 
Japan’s external balance by changing domestic savings behavior and incentives for 
international capital flows.  Because of the scope of ongoing changes and the complexity of 
likely economic responses to those changes, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding 
their macroeconomic and balance of payments effect. 
In 1996, the Japanese government announced the beginning of a comprehensive 
program of financial market reform, dubbed, as in the United Kingdom, the Big Bang.  The 
aim: to transform a highly restrictive, costly, and rule-bound financial system that had fallen 
behind technologically and operationally; the objective: to create in Tokyo a market that 
would be open, global, and competitive, to match markets operating in East Asia and, 
perhaps optimistically, in New York and London.  The proposed steps remove regulatory 
barriers between various types of financial institutions and allow development of new 
financial products like derivatives.  They increase financial transparency.  There are also 
proposals to remove restrictions on foreign exchange and on portfolio holdings, both 
domestic and foreign.  Legally, all the requisite measures should be in place by 2001, but it is 
likely to take many years before they are fully operational.  Moreover, they are coming at a 
time when the Japanese financial system is in great difficulty that may complicate their 
implementation.  (Taniuchi, 1997.) 
Despite the likely delays, some measures are already in force, and some international 
financial companies have already drawn on them to expand their operations into the Japanese 
market.  Viewing Japanese financial markets from a dynamic perspective, over a span of many 
years, the Big Bang measures are likely to greatly intensify competition.  The resulting shakeout 
can be expected to accelerate the pace of financial innovation, to improve economies of scale,   14
and to reduce costs.  Foreign financial institutions, whose expertise and experience far 
exceeds that of Japanese firms, are likely to be important beneficiaries.  (Dekle, 1997, p. 243.) 
Of particular importance to our discussion are the liberalization in the assets that 
may be held by pension funds, insurance companies and banks, and the amendment of the 
foreign exchange law to allow unrestricted holdings of foreign assets.  The range of assets 
available to Japanese security holders will expand considerably, and it is highly likely that they 
will want to increase their holdings of foreign securities and accounts.  
It is difficult, however, to pin down the macroeconomic impacts and balance of 
payments impacts.  There are likely to be financial flows both in and out.  Initially, Japanese 
financial markets will represent a target of opportunity for foreign financial enterprises, 
drawing a substantial capital investment into the market for a period of time.  On the other 
hand, there is reason to expect net financial outflows.  Security yields in Japan have been low 
by world standards and could go lower as competition and market efficiency increase.  
Diversification into high return securities, many of them foreign, is likely to increase, and that 
will mean significant incentives for financial outflows at least until an equilibrium in asset 
holdings has been attained.  On balance, this will mean outflows of capital, on top of the 
already large acquisition of foreign assets that is ongoing.   
Will these changes increase aggregate saving?  In view of the high personal savings 
rate that already prevails and because other considerations are likely to be more important, it 
is not likely that much higher saving rates will occur.  More probably there will be diversion 
of funds from traditional domestic uses to mutual funds investing in equities at home and 
abroad.  Ultimately some increase in Japanese interest rates—convergence to higher rates 
prevailing abroad—is likely, perhaps accompanied in the interim by a downward realignment 
of the yen.   
While the impacts may not be large in terms of the macro economy, they may be very 
significant for sectoral development, for example for the financial sector and for development 
of capital intensive high tech sectors.  The financial sector is likely to expand greatly, with   15
more active underwriting and trading, on the model of the effect of the Big Bang in London, 
though we have no illusions that Tokyo will rival London for many years to come.  For 
sectors that require capital, interest rates may be higher, more in line with world standards, 
but there may be greater availability of funds for venture capital type enterprises.  Greater 
financial market efficiency may raise productivity in important sectors of the economy. 
4.  How Japan will change:  the implications of adjustment 
The results of the previous section make clear that predicting the path of Japan’s 
current account and its implications is far from simple.  In the absence of other 
developments, aging of Japan’s population will lead to a decline in savings, which will likely 
exceed any fall in investment, and therefore reduce the surplus.  But other developments may 
intervene, particularly financial opening, which may cause more savings to flow abroad, 
presumably out of a smaller total.  While the latter development may affect the value of the 
yen and the pace of trade adjustment, the consensus view clearly favors an eventual 
movement to a lower current account path.   In this section we use simulation analysis to 
consider the implications for the Japanese economy of forces acting on the current account.14 
The process of adjustment to a lower current account balance would involve changes 
at the macroeconomic level but also in the structure of the domestic economy.  A surplus 
country moving toward balance experiences an increase in spending relative to income, and a 
shift of production from tradable to non-tradable goods.  The industry composition of 
output changes in response to changing total spending and relative prices, so that the leading 
industries for the surplus period may not be leading industries for a later period.  These 
adjustments in economic structure need not be problematic with sufficiently flexible labor 
markets; resources would merely flow out of tradable and into non-tradable goods.  In reality, 
there are likely to be significant short-run economic dislocations associated with these 
adjustments.   16
4.1  Simulating the adjustment process  
The simulation model employed in this analysis is the Japan Long-term Model (JLM), 
an econometric model of the Japanese economy, developed by Shuntaro Shishido. (Adams 
and Shishido, 1988; Adams, Gangnes and Shishido, 1993.)  The JLM model is a 
macroeconomic forecasting model with industrially disaggregated production, employment 
and trade sectors.  Such a model represents the economy on the computer in terms of, 
literally, thousands of interrelated  behavioral, technical, and accounting  relationships.  It can 
be used to forecast and to evaluate macroeconomic adjustment.   It also provides information 
on how the gains and burdens of adjustment are distributed among the various sectors of the 
economy. In other words, it provides a consistent picture of potential developments at the 
macro level and of their implications at the industry micro level.  In many previous 
applications the JLM has been integrated into a world model system, Project LINK.  But in 
the interest of clarity, for the present analysis the JLM is solved as a “stand alone” model with 
explicit assumptions about developments in the rest of the world.   
A detailed exposition of the JLM model is beyond the scope of this paper.  Here, we 
describe the model in general terms, with an emphasis on trade flows and adjustment.  (See 
the references above for more complete presentations.)  Structurally, the macro core of the 
JLM model combines Keynesian-type expenditure relationships and a Leontief inter-industry 
system with important supply-side constraints.  In the short-run, equilibrium is largely 
demand-determined.  Demand, including net exports, determines production levels in each 
industry and the employment needed to produce this output.  Labor market conditions 
determine wage growth, which together with excess demand conditions drives price inflation.  
Income growth feeds back to affect final demand, while wage and price changes influence 
final demand, production costs and employment growth.   
  Over the longer term, the dynamics of the model are driven by capital accumulation 
and population growth.  A demographic model determines the evolution of population and 
the labor force.  Investment, determined in part by endogenous technical progress, generates   17
capital accumulation and resulting changes in productive capacity.  The monetary and fiscal 
sectors of the economy are fully modeled.  With regard to the balance of payments, exports 
and imports are modeled at the industry level as functions of income and international 
competitiveness.  As we have noted, net trade quantities directly affect demand for industry 
output.  Import prices affect industry input costs.  Aggregation of trade prices and quantities 
produces aggregate values for the trade balance and also affects other key macroeconomic 
variables.  
Trade adjustment in the model comes about through changes in absorption and 
relative prices acting on the import and export equations.  The sources of such change range 
from direct movements in income under a fiscal expansion to relative price changes 
associated with exchange rate realignment or changes in domestic inflation.  Income and price 
elasticities influence the extent of adjustment, as do the multiplier properties of the model 
and the nature of inter-industry linkages.  Japanese export price equations incorporate varying 
degrees of pricing-to-market behavior when exchange rates change, limiting the extent of 
actual relative price movement.  Changes in national price levels also create real money 
balance and wealth effects that further effect absorption and trade balance adjustment.   
We evaluate the impact of policy changes and developments using forecast 
simulations of the JLM model.  The simulation analysis is conducted by first establishing a 
baseline forecast for the period 1999-2005, assuming no significant changes in policy or the 
economic environment.  The model is then re-solved with one or more changes in exogenous 
assumptions.  Simulation results can then be compared to the baseline forecast path.   
There are important limitations to the model and to this analysis.  In this model, as in 
many macro systems, the current account is determined by trade response.  There is no 
explicit modeling of the capital account or of its impact on the exchange rate.  In other 
words, the model does not contain the asset demand/portfolio balance features of capital 
flow determination that we have noted above.  The effects of capital flows on exchange rates 
must be handled through appropriate assumptions, and corresponding exchange rate   18
adjustments must be made.  The fiscal and monetary policy posture also requires judgmental 
adjustment.  There are, moreover, no automatic mechanisms to enforce current account 
sustainability, absent appropriate assumptions by the modeler.  To achieve a realistic picture 
of real world developments, great care must be taken to assure that structural changes that are 
handled by the model are matched by appropriate judgmental adjustments of non modeled 
variables.   
4.2  A Baseline Forecast Path 
We begin by establishing a baseline simulation path for the Japanese economy for the 
period through 2005.  This forecast path is determined by solving the model forward given 
recent history and reasonable assumptions about various exogenous influences, including 
demographic change and the external trade environment.  The medium-term horizon 
reported here permits discussion of medium-run macroeconomic adjustments and allows us 
to anticipate fundamental changes that may not be fully felt for some time. 
Macroeconomic policy assumptions have an important impact on the baseline.  In 
fact, we found that in the absence of significant ongoing macro stimulus the forecast path for 
the economy would be very anemic.  This is not surprising considering the economy’s 
extraordinary recent weakness.  However, we do not consider this a realistic scenario.  As the 
string of 1990s fiscal packages makes clear, the government is likely to provide additional 
fiscal and perhaps monetary expansion as needed to buoy the economy.  Following the spirit 
of recent proposals, we assume a package of personal tax cuts and government investment 
spending beginning in 1999.  These policies amount to a net fiscal stimulus of 6 trillion Yen 
in 1999 and about 10 trillion yen each year thereafter, or roughly 2% of Gross National 
Expenditure (GNE) per year.  They are sufficient to restore 2.1% growth in 2000, and to pull 
the unemployment rate down to the 3.8% range by 2001.  This is still weak performance by 
historical standards; the unemployment rate remains above 3% until the final year of the   19
forecast horizon.  The government deficit increases by a cumulative 12% of GNE over the 
period. 
A summary of the baseline forecast is given in Table 3.  The forecast path for the 
current account shows continued widening of the surplus, both in dollar terms and as a share 
of GNE.  This stems from relatively weak import demand compared with the assumed 
growth in real exports.  Notice that this import weakness occurs despite an assumed gradual 
appreciation of the yen against the dollar during the period.  This then sets the stage for a 
consideration of alternative scenarios that may involve adjustment to a smaller current 
account surplus. 
4.3  Current Account Adjustment Scenarios 
We consider in turn scenarios to explore macroeconomic and current account 
implications of three potential developments discussed above: an increasing reliance on 
imported manufactures, particularly from Asia, the aging of Japan’s population, and the 
effects of increased financial liberalization.  In each case, an attempt is made to create a 
realistic scenario that can provide meaningful qualitative information about how adjustment 
might proceed, both at the macro level and at the level of individual sectors.  By their nature 
such scenarios are speculative and involve somewhat arbitrary assumptions, and so should 
not be taken as giving specific forecasts of the actual Japanese adjustment path.  In each case, 
the scenario takes the baseline forecast as a starting point and then assumes one or more 
changes in important driving influences.  The model is re-solved and the results can be 
compared to the baseline path. 
Increased imports of manufactured goods and materials 
To capture aspects of the expected increase in Japanese reliance on Asian countries 
for manufactured goods production, we simulate an increase in Japanese manufacturing 
imports.  Compared to the baseline forecast, we assume a higher rate of growth of Japanese 
imports of high-tech equipment, and to a lesser extent also industrial materials and mass-  20
produced “low-tech” manufactures.  These changes move Japanese import patterns closer to 
those prevailing in the U.S. and Europe, as described in section 3.2, above.  In fact, the more 
rapid import growth in these sectors is sufficient to raise Japan’s high-tech import share by 
five percentage points and other manufactures by two to three percentage points.  Overall, 
the import adjustment amounts to about 7% of aggregate imports by the end of the forecast 
period.  Net increases for individual industries vary because of endogenous response to 
changing income and price conditions. 
As shown in Table 4, the rise in imports reduces the current account-to-GNE ratio to 
2.5%, compared with its rise to 3.5% in the baseline.  The dollar current account falls below 
$140 billion, a reduction of more than $60 billion from the original baseline.  To the extent 
that increased imports compete with domestic production, economic activity in Japan will 
suffer, at least during the short run.  We see this in the simulation as a reduction of the GNE 
growth rate by 0.5% to 0.7% per year.  Consumer prices rise a bit less rapidly as a result. 
The potential adjustment challenge from increased reliance on imports can also be 
seen in the industry-level effects of Table 5.  Here we show changes in real gross output for 
the same broad groups of industries identified in section 3.2.  The figures given are 
differences in output levels compared with baseline forecast levels.  Notice that output 
declines relative to the initial baseline in all sectors of the economy, because of the 
recessionary impact of increased imports.  But output contraction is centered in the 
manufactured goods sectors themselves, particularly in mass-produced goods, where 
significant percentage increases are assumed on a large initial import base.  Non-
manufactured goods sectors and services fall relatively less.  This implies substantial negative 
employment effects in manufacturing, and therefore the potential for severe labor market 
dislocation in regions that are heavily dependent on manufacturing industries.   21
Population Decline and Aging 
In this simulation we evaluate the likely effects of changing Japanese demographics.  
The demographic issue becomes important over a longer time horizon than we are working 
with here.  Nevertheless, we can gain insight into how these changes will influence the 
economy by simulating a decline in the population and a corresponding reduction in the 
savings rate.  Population is assumed to decline at an annual rate of 0.2% to 0.3% per year over 
the forecast horizon.  Consistent with an aging population, the ratio of savings to GNE falls 
by about 3 percentage points15   
The macroeconomic effect of these demographic changes is summarized in Table 6.  
The shift from savings to increased consumption provides a substantial demand-side  
stimulus to the economy.  The extraordinarily high rate of saving that lies behind the 
sluggishness of the Japanese economy and its foreign surplus is reduced as older people draw 
on assets to meet consumption needs.  Real gross national expenditure grows roughly one 
percent faster than in the baseline forecast, and the unemployment rate falls to 2.1% by the 
end of the simulation period.  Growth is actually held back by supply-side constraints, lower 
labor force growth and increasingly severe labor market tightness.  The combination of rising 
labor demand and falling population drives wages up by a cumulative 20% after 7 years (not 
shown).  Consumer prices accelerate as well.  Higher product prices in turn reduce Japanese 
international competitiveness that, along with stronger domestic demand, stimulates imports 
and restrains exports.  The current account falls by 1.4% of GNE over the simulation period, 
or $60 billion compared with the baseline. 
Clearly rapid population aging has the potential to substantially alter Japan’s savings-
investment balance and therefore it current account.  The implied industrial restructuring 
that accompanies this current account turnaround would be greater than this simulation 
suggests, once one allows for the changing expenditure patterns that will result as an aging 
population shifts increasingly toward services and away from durable goods.   22
Financial Liberalization 
As we indicated above, it is difficult to anticipate the effects of Japanese financial 
market liberalization on the direction of financial flows and adjustments in exchange rates 
and other macroeconomic variables.  Some aspects of ongoing and planned liberalization may 
facilitate capital outflows; others may permit domestic financial institutions to provide saving 
vehicles that are more competitive with those in the West, keeping more of Japan's saved 
resources at home.  In the medium run, the former is perhaps the more likely scenario.  Here 
we simulate the effect of capital outflows that might follow a complete liberalization of 
Japanese outward financial flows.  The outflows are assumed to drive Japanese interest rates 
up to levels prevailing in the U.S., an increase in the bank lending rate of 250 basis points.  
The yen can be expected to depreciate in response to increased capital outflows.  We 
assume that the long-run exchange value of the yen falls by five percent against the dollar.  
Because the closing of the interest rate gap takes several years, the yen overshoots moderately 
in the short run.  
The impact effect of these changes on aggregate economic activity is approximately 
neutral.  Investment begins to decline, but the yen’s depreciation significantly stimulates 
export sales.  The current account surplus increases in the short term.  Once the interest rate 
increase is fully in effect, the investment contraction becomes very severe; business fixed 
investment falls 20% below baseline levels after four years, reducing the level of real gross 
national expenditure 6% below the baseline.   
The export boom is eventually crowded out as higher interest rates raise prices 
throughout the Japanese economy and eliminate the competitive gains from depreciation.  
Falling income reduces import demand nearly 3% over the course of the forecast, offsetting 
partly the yen’s valuation effects that tend to raise the dollar cost of given import volumes.  
Overall, the simulation illustrates well the potential complexity of current account 
forecasting, with the trade balance moving first up, then down, and finishing not substantially 
different from its baseline level of $200 billion dollars in 2005.    23
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the sources of Japan’s continuing trade surpluses and 
the forces that will act on the surplus in coming years.   Aspects of Japan’s recent history may 
explain the country’s tendency toward trade surplus.  These include a population 
concentrated in the middle age years, Japan’s high rate of economic growth, cycles of 
government tax and expenditure policies, and institutional factors that favor exports over 
imports and capital outflows.  Currently, Japan’s surplus is augmented somewhat by the 
economy’s unprecedented weakness.  Slow growth and a yen appreciation cycle this decade 
can account for perhaps a third of Japan’s current surplus.   
Looking to the next century, anticipated change in these forces can be expected to 
reduce Japan’s trade surplus.  An aging economy will generate less need for savings and, 
consequently, relatively more consumption, probably for a mix of products with more 
services and fewer manufactures.  The consensus in the literature favors a reduction in 
Japanese net savings, although the bulk of these effects may not be felt for many years.  
Changes in Japan’s relationship with Asian economies and the substantial changes in 
domestic financial markets will also affect aggregate trade and capital flows, as well as the 
composition of such flows.  
The current account surplus has represented a source of aggregate demand for 
Japanese produced goods.  A reduction of the surplus would negatively impact demand and 
output in the medium term.  At the same time, Japanese consumers are expected to buy more 
and save less as they age into the retirement years, perhaps offsetting part of any aggregate 
demand shortfall.   It will be important for Japan to maintain an appropriate macro policy 
stance to sustain full employment during the period of adjustment to a lower current account 
balance.     24
While fiscal and monetary policy can offset adverse macroeconomic effects of current 
account adjustment, these aggregate economic impacts represent only a part of the story.  
Adjustment to a smaller (or even negative) trade balance has potentially profound 
implications for the structure of Japanese industry and employment.  Shifts at the sectoral 
level—between domestic tradable and nontradable goods, between manufactured goods and 
services—are likely to be an economically costly and socially painful feature of the anticipated 
readjustment of the Japanese economy. 
Just as Japan’s emerging surpluses were observed with keen interest (and not a little 
fear) by other countries during the 1980s, their eventual reduction will be of great potential 
importance to the global economy.  A reduction in the large surplus could bring welcome 
relief from protectionist political pressure in the U.S. and Europe.  However, similar voices 
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Figure 3. Japan's Import Intensity




























Table 1.  Breakdown of Trade by Resource Intensity 
 
Category  SITC  Resource Intensity 
1, Raw Food  00-99  Land 
2. Processed Ag. Products  11-29, 41-43  Land, Labor 
3. Fuels  32-35  Natural Resources 
4. Industrial Materials  51-59, 67-69  Nat. Resou., Capital, Labor 
5, Mass Prod. Manufactures  61-66, 81-85  Labor, Capital 
6.High Tech Goods  91-97, 81-89, 71-79  Capital, Human Capital 
Source: Adams and Shachmurove (1997).   
Table 2.  Sectoral Breakdown of Trade 




1  2  3  4  5  6    1  2  3  4  5  6 
  Imports 
  1980    1992 
To Japan  9.9  18.2  50.1  8.4  4.4  9.0    14.4  13.6  23.0  12.9  12.7  23.3 
To U.S.  6.8  6.0  32.9  11.5  10.6  32.3    4.5  4.5  10.4  10.4  16.0  54.2 
To Europe  9.0  5.1  8.1  22.5  15.4  39.8    8.9  4.5  3.1  20.2  15.6  47.6 
                           
  Exports 
  1980    1992 
From Japan  1.1  1.3  0.4  21.6  8.3  67.4    0.5  0.8  0.5  11.9  5.6  80.7 
From U.S.  6.8  6.0  32.9  11.5  10.6  32.3    4.5  4.0  10.5  10.5  16.1  54.4 
From Europe  8.9  5.1  8.1  22.4  15.8  39.7    8.1  4.1  2.8  27.1  14.3  43.5 
Source: Adams and Shachmurove (1997).     29
Table 3.  Baseline Forecast with Fiscal Stimulus 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Real GNE (Growth Rate, %)  -2.7  -0.2  2.1  2.5  2.5  2.9  3.1  2.8 
Consumer Prices (Gr. Rate)  0.6  0.2  0.9  1.6  1.1  1.0  1.5  2.2 
Population (Gr. Rate)  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.1 
Employment (Gr. Rate)  -0.8  -0.4  0.4  0.7  0.7  0.8  1.0  1.1 
Unemployment Rate (%)  4.1  4.6  4.3  3.8  3.9  3.7  3.3  3.0 
                 
Real Exports (Gr. Rate)  -2.3  2.0  3.9  3.9  4.0  3.8  3.8  4.0 
Real Imports (Gr. Rate)  -8.0  1.4  2.0  2.4  2.7  3.6  4.6  5.1 
CA/GNE Ratio (%)  3.0  3.2  3.2  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.5  3.5 
Current Account ($ Bil.)  119.2  134.6  143.3  155.8  165.3  176  190.6  200 
Yen/Dollar Exch. Rate  130.1  120.0  118.2  116.4  114.7  113.0  111.3  109.6 
Note:  1998 figures are approximately historical data; 1999-2005 are forecasts. 
 
 
Table 4.  Increased Imports of Manufactured Goods 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Real GNE (Growth Rate, %)  1.6  1.9  1.8  2.2  2.4  2.0 
  Cumulative Diff. fr. Baseline  -0.5  -1.1  -1.8  -2.4  -3.0  -3.8 
Consumer Prices (Gr. Rate)  0.9  1.6  0.9  0.8  1.2  1.7 
             
Real Exports (Gr. Rate)  3.9  3.9  4.0  4.0  3.9  4.2 
Real Imports (Gr. Rate)  3.1  3.4  3.8  4.7  5.7  6.4 
CA/GNE Ratio (%)  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.8  2.7  2.5 
   Diff. From Baseline  -0.2  -0.3  -0.5  -0.6  -0.8  -1.0 
Current Account ($ Bil.)  135.7  139.7  139.9  140.2  142.9  136.2 
   Diff. From Baseline  -7.6  -16.2  -25.3  -35.8  -47.7  -63.7 
 
 
Table 5. Increased Imports of Manufactured Goods: 
Resulting changes in real gross industry output  (% difference from baseline) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Raw Food and Agric., Prod  -0.2  -0.5  -0.8  -1.1  -1.5  -2.0 
Processed Foods and Ag. Prod  -0.1  -0.3  -0.4  -0.6  -0.8  -1.0 
Fuels and Prods  -0.1  -0.4  -0.8  -1.3  -1.8  -2.5 
Industrial Materials  -0.4  -1.2  -1.9  -2.5  -3.1  -3.8 
Mass Produced Manufactures  -1.2  -2.6  -4.0  -5.3  -6.6  -8.2 
High Tech Goods  -0.8  -1.9  -2.8  -3.7  -4.5  -5.5 
Services  -0.4  -1.0  -1.6  -2.1  -2.7  -3.4 
   30
 
Table 6. Japanese Population Decline and Aging 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Real GNE (Growth Rate, %)  -0.3  3.2  3.8  3.6  3.9  4.2  2.8 
  Cumulative Diff. fr. Baseline  0.0  1.1  2.3  3.4  4.4  5.5  5.5 
Consumer Prices (Gr. Rate)  0.4  1.4  3.0  2.6  2.2  2.8  4.1 
Population (Gr. Rate)  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3 
Employment (Gr. Rate)  -0.4  0.4  0.8  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.1 
Unemployment Rate (%)  4.2  3.5  2.7  2.8  2.9  2.5  2.1 
               
Real Exports (Gr. Rate)  1.9  3.7  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.4 
Real Imports (Gr. Rate)  1.5  3.1  4.0  4.1  4.8  6.2  5.9 
CA/GNE Ratio (%)  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.7  2.5  2.3  2.1 
  Diff. From Baseline  0.0  -0.2  -0.5  -0.7  -1.0  -1.2  -1.4 
Current Account ($ Bil)  134.4  137.2  141.2  140.7  140.5  141.9  140.5 
  Diff. From Baseline  -0.2  -6.1  -14.6  -24.6  -35.6  -48.7  -59.4 
               
HH Savings Rate (Diff from  
  Baseline, %) 
0.0  -0.2  -0.5  -1.1  -1.9  -2.6  -3.0 
 
 
Table 7. Japanese Capital Outflows 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Real GNE (Growth Rate,%)  1.5  2.8  -0.7  1.3  2.1  2.4 
  Cumulative Diff. fr. Baseline  -0.6  -0.3  -3.4  -4.9  -5.8  -6.1 
Bank Lending Rate (%)  3.1  4.0  5.1  5.1  5.1  5.1 
  Diff. from Baseline (ppts.)  0.75  1.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50 
Business Invest ( Diff. 
  from Baseline, %) 
-3.6  -8.1  -15.0  -19.8  -21.5  -21.6 
             
Real Exports (Gr. Rate)  6.1  7.8  -0.3  3.5  3.2  3.6 
  Diff. fr. Baseline (%)  2.2  6.0  1.7  1.4  0.8  0.4 
Real Imports (Gr. Rate)  2.1  2.1  1.6  2.6  4.6  4.6 
  Diff. fr. Baseline (%)  0.1  -0.3  -1.3  -2.2  -2.3  -2.7 
CA/GNE Ratio (%)  3.0  3.9  3.5  3.6  3.6  3.7 
Current Account ($ Bil.)  123.2  174.0  162.7  172.5  181.0  196.3 
Yen/Dollar Exch. Rate  126.0  123.1  120.5  118.7  116.9  115.1 
  Diff. from Baseline (%)  6.6  5.7  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0 
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Endnotes 
 
1 For recent discussions see McKibbin and Sachs (1991),  McKibbin (1996), and Krugman (1998). 
2 This is essentially a portfolio balance story a la Kouri (1976) and Obstfeld (l981.)  We note that portfolio 
decisions involve stocks of assets rather than current saving, but changes in desired stocks imply flow savings 
adjustments.  Expectations about the exchange rate are likely to reflect the relationship between current rates and 
long term rates, perhaps PPP rates, as well as foreign exchange reserve positions. 
3 Of, course the identity (S-I) = CF = NX  must always hold.  But it is not possible simply to assume that S and I 
determine CF  and NX unless one assumes an economy at full employment income.  S is endogenously related to 
income. Given international competitiveness and demands for foreign assets, a decline in I could reduce Y and S 
leaving NX and CF unaffected.  In the real world, adjustment is, however, also likely to involve relative prices, 
returns on investment, and the exchange rate.   
4 The importance of intertemporal behavior in Japan’s current account experience is demonstrated by several 
historical episodes.  Consistent with consumption-smoothing behavior, Japan’s current account swung into deficit 
during the Russo-Japanese war 1904-05 and also at the time of the Tokyo earthquake in 1923.  During the World 
War I boom, a period of high world interest rates, Japan switched from net international debtor to net creditor.  
(See Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996.)  We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this point. 
5 For a summary, see Heller and Symansky(1997.)  But not all studies support these conclusions; for example, see 
Bosworth (1993) and Adams and Prazmowski (1996.) Higgins (1998), on the basis of a pooled cross-country 
analysis concludes that the shift in Japanese age distribution between the 1950s and the 1980s can account for a 
nearly six percentage point rise in the savings rate over this period. 
6 We do not take into account, here, corporate savings, including allowances for capital consumption, though from 
a macroeconomic perspective these should also be considered. They may well be linked to the profitability and 
investment patterns of Japanese corporations. 
7 Krugman (1998) returns to the traditional idea of the liquidity trap, and offers the controversial recommendation 
that Japan escape the trap by generating inflationary expectations. 
8 There has been considerable research on aging in Japan and other developed economies.  See, for example, Hurd 
and Yashiro (1997) and Ermisch and Ogawa (1994). 
9 In addition to the discussion by Mason and Ogawa (this volume) see, for example, Masson and Tryon, 1990, and 
Higgins and Williamson (1996.) Heller (1989) applies projections of demographic change to several published   32
 
savings models and finds a reduction in private savings of 3% to 12% of GDP by 2010.  Masson and Tryon (1990) 
predict a 3% of GDP drop in national savings by 2010, similar to that of Wescott (1995).  Higgins (1998) predicts 
a 6% drop in savings by 2010 and greater than 9% drop by 2025.  Horioka (1993) estimates a greater that 15% 
reduction in the private savings rate between 1990 and 2010, with private savings rates turning negative by some 
measures. 
10 Masson and Tryon (1990) predict a 1.8% reduction in the investment-to-GDP ratio between 1995 and 2025, 
much smaller than a 4.3% expected drop in savings.  Noguchi (1990) sees much smaller declines in investment so 
that the current account rises in the 2000-2010 period, before gradually declining after 2010.  An Economic 
Planning Agency (1991) study sees relatively flat investment, but declining savings, so that current account balance 
turns to deficit soon after 2000.  Yashiro and Oishi (1997) present scenarios with alternative assumptions 
regarding technological change and endogenous labor force participation, with the real current account declining 
to a deficit of –0.6% to –2.8% of GDP in the first decade of the twenty-first century.  On the basis of an historical 
pooled cross-section model tying savings and investment to demographic change, Higgins (1998) predicts that 
investment will actually fall faster than savings, so that Japan’s capital exports will increase by 2% to 3% of GDP 
over the next 25 years.  Auerbach et al. (1989) predict a 2% of GDP drop in the current account by 2010 and a 
shift to a 1.5% negative current account by 2030. 
11 An important exception is China, which has not yet devalued it currency. 
12 Impacts on industrial structure in Japan are also discussed in Blomstrom, Konan, and Lipsey (this volume).   
13 See also, Ministry of Finance (1997).  An excellent evaluation is Dekle (1998). 
14 An issue beyond the scope of the present analysis is the effect of smaller Japanese current account balance on 
the global savings-investment balance.  Japan has been the single largest provider of net capital to the global 
economy in recent years, and an end to this supply may raise world interest rates and retard global investment and 
growth.  Whether or not a global savings shortage emerges depends on changes in savings supply from other 
countries.  On this, the evidence is not yet clearly set.  See Wescott (1995) and Higgins (1998) for optimistic 
appraisals and Heller and Symansky (1997) for a more sober assessment. 
15 The assumed decline in savings propensity (and rise in consumption propensity) is consistent with previous 
estimates of the effects of aging on savings behavior.  Masson and Tryon (1990) report that the effect of a one 
percent rise in the elderly dependency ratio is to reduce the private savings rate by 0.5% to 1.6% in a group of   33
 
well-known studies.  The elderly dependency ratio is projected to fall by three percentage points between 2000 and 
2005, so that a 3% fall in the savings rate is near the middle of the range of estimates. 